The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations. There is evidence in the literature of fiscal consolidation episodes producing (non-Keynesian) expansionary effects in the short run (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). We replicate this result for a panel of OECD countries under exogeneity of the fiscal tightening decision, and provide evidence that this decision might be endogenous to GDP. Once a simple form of endogeneity is taken into consideration, we find that expansionary effects disappear and recover the typical Keynesian effects of fiscal policy. Our reading of this finding is that revived economic growth might take place in spite of the consolidation but not as a consequence of it. JEL Codes: H30, H62, C23.
Introduction
In response to the global crisis that erupted in 2008, comprehensive support packages have been implemented by fiscal authorities in many G20 countries. These expansionary fiscal measures, together with cyclical revenue losses and expenditure hikes, have resulted in sharp increases in budget deficits. Therefore, many governments are already preparing (or have already implemented) budgetary consolidation measures to ensure fiscal sustainability. In this context it is interesting to investigate the potential impact of fiscal consolidations on economic growth, an issue that it is far from having a definitive answer in the literature. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) describe the possibility that fiscal consolidation episodes could be expansionary for an economy, challenging the broadly accepted Keynesian notion * Contact: Banco de España. pablo.hernandez de cos@bde.es and enrique.moral@gmail.com. We would like to thank Manuel Arellano, Eric Leeper, and seminar participants at the Spanish Economic Association Meeting in Málaga and Banco de España for useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Silvia Ardagna for kindly sharing the data. The opinions and analyses are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
concerning the existence of a positive fiscal policy multiplier. 1 In particular, they observed a consumption increase during the fiscal stabilisation in Ireland from 1987 to 1989 and in Denmark from 1983 to 1986. Since this consumption increase was not fully explained by the usual sources such as disposable income, the authors concluded that it was due to the fiscal adjustment and thus these episodes constituted expansionary fiscal adjustments. Giavazzi and Pagano's (1990) paper has generated a growing literature concerning the so-called non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, e.g. Cour et al. (1996) , Ardagna (1998, 2010) , Miller and Russek (2003) . These studies are based on empirical analyses in which they first identify periods of drastic and sizeable budget cuts within a panel of OECD countries, and then perform a descriptive analysis of the sample characteristics of macroeconomic aggregates, mainly GDP, before, during, and after the year in which the consolidation episode took place. The main conclusion from this literature is that fiscal adjustments are often followed by an improved growth performance, which is interpreted as evidence of non-Keynesian effects during fiscal consolidation episodes. In a recent paper, Perotti (2011) discusses in detail four case studies of the expansionary fiscal consolidation hypothesis and relate them with the current situation of the Eurozone.
2
A positive correlation between fiscal consolidation episodes and GDP growth does not necessarily mean that fiscal consolidations generate economic growth. In fact, this strand of the literature implicitly assumes that the consolidation episode is exogenous to GDP. 3 The positive correlation between fiscal adjustments and economic growth may be the result of a positive effect from GDP growth to fiscal consolidation instead of the other way around as suggested in this literature: the expectation of a recovery (stronger during the trough of the cycle) may increase the likelihood of public finance consolidation (i.e. consolidation episodes are endogenous to GDP). 4 Based on the simple empirical specification typically considered in this literature, the main aim of this paper is to tackle these endogeneity issues in order to investigate whether there is a positive causal effect from fiscal consolidation to 1 Feldstein's (1982) paper is probably the first to find evidence in favor of the non-Keynesian hypothesis of fiscal policy. In particular, the paper presents a negative and statistically significant estimate for the public expenditure coefficient in a private consumption function. Feldstein argued that reductions in public expenses may be expansionist if they are seen as an indication of future tax cuts. Kormendi and Meguire (1990) also find evidence of this non-Keynesian result. 2 Looking at fourteen case studies Kumar et al. (2007) conclude that while fiscal consolidations tend to have short-run contractionary effects, they can be expansionary in the long run. 3 As discussed below, some attempts have been made in the literature to address the potential endogeneity of the fiscal consolidation decision. For example, Ardagna (2004) instruments fiscal consolidation episodes with political variables such as the orientation of the government party, but ignores the endogeneity of other fiscal variables such as the size of the consolidation. Song and Park (2011) also deal with endogeneity of the consolidation decision using fiscal variables (tax revenues and expenditures) as instruments assumed to be exogenous to GDP. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and Giavazzi et al. (2000) respectively estimate consumption and savings equations accounting for potential endogeneity problems of fiscal variables such as taxes (i.e. the instrument government taxes with the government surplus). 4 Note that in our framework, expectations about future economic performance are responsible of the endogeneity of fiscal consolidations. Therefore, this intuition is not at odds with the pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy documented in the literature (e.g. Alesina et al., 2008) .
GDP growth in the short run (i.e. non-Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustment episodes). Our main conclusion is that endogeneity biases might be chiefly responsible for the nonKeynesian results previously found in the literature; hence, despite revived economic growth might take place the year after the consolidation we conclude that it is not a result of the fiscal adjustment. Instead, we argue that the timing of the consolidation is caused by the expectation of recovery in GDP growth. Another critical point in previous approaches is the definition of the fiscal consolidation episodes. Selecting large-scale fiscal adjustments implies, on the one hand, choosing a measure of fiscal policy, and, on the other, defining what "large-scale" means precisely. As for the measure of fiscal policy, the empirical literature essentially relies on large reductions observed in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance (e.g. Blanchard, 1993) . With respect to the meaning of "large scale", we might consider the size criterion (i.e. a sufficiently large reduction in the primary balance in a given period), the persistence criterion (i.e. a sufficiently long time period during which the primary budget balance constantly improves), or a combination of both. However, all these fiscal consolidation definitions suffer from a potential problem of sample selection causing reverse causality concerns between the consolidation episode and economic growth. This is so because, according to the different criteria employed in the literature, the different studies only analyse successful consolidations while many failed attempts to reduce fiscal deficits are ignored. In search of exogenous sources of variation in fiscal policy, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , and Romer and Romer (2010) follow a narrative approach for defining large discretionary changes in fiscal policy that do not depend on the success of the policy. 5 Although both papers are based on a VAR framework, this narrative approach seems to be a promising alternative to deal with endogeneity when defining fiscal consolidation episodes. In fact, the IMF's WEO (October 2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) follow this narrative approach and define fiscal consolidation episodes for a sample of OECD countries over the period 1980-2009. According to the IMF definition, fiscal consolidations are, on average, followed by negative GDP growth in the short run. In this paper we find that, controlling for potential feedback from economic growth to fiscal tightening decisions, the two alternative definitions of fiscal consolidations proposed in the literature provide the same result: fiscal adjustments are found to have a negative effect on GDP growth. However, since the timing of the consolidation might be driven by expectations of economic recovery at the end of recessions, we conclude that revived economic growth might take place in spite of the consolidation but not as a consequence of it. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The data used in the paper are 5 Romer and Romer (2010) identify large tax policy actions in the US according to the narrative record, such as presidential speeches and Congressional reports. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) construct a war dummy that identifies large increases in government expenditure due to military reasons in the US. 6 There is an enormous VAR literature analysing the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy. Methods for separately identifying government expenditure and government revenue shocks in VARs have been developed in the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) . Within the VAR framework, Perotti (1999) finds that there is a higher probability of fiscal policy being non-Keynesian when there is a significantly high public debt-to-GDP ratio.
described in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates the potential endogeneity of fiscal consolidation episodes and describes the empirical approach considered to estimate causal effects from fiscal consolidations to economic performance. In Section 4 we present the empirical results. Finally, some concluding remarks are discussed in Section 5.
Data
The data used in this The dataset includes fiscal variables (e.g. the government debt level, the primary busget balance as a share of GDP, and current primary expenditures) as well as a set of macro variables (e.g. the GDP growth rate, the exchange rate, the short-term interest rate, aggregate investment). Additional information on the variables considered can be found in the Appendix.
Finally, we also consider in the dataset two different dummy variables identifying the consolidation episodes. On the one hand, we have the dummy from Alesina and Ardagna (2010) -henceforth AA2010 -that identifies a fiscal consolidation episode in a given year if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improves by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP (analogously, a stimulus dummy takes the value 1 if the CAPB deteriorates by at least 1.5 per cent of GDP). Alternatively, we also consider the IMF consolidation dummy 8 defined following the narrative approach and focusing on policy actions (i.e. years in which the government implemented tax hikes or spending cuts to reduce the budget deficit regardless of the change in the CAPB).
3 Empirical Approach
Are Fiscal Consolidation Episodes Endogenous?
We first provide some motivating and heuristic evidence of our main concern throughout the paper, the potential endogeneity of fiscal consolidation episodes. Furthermore, in Section 4 we discuss additional econometric tests which give support to the idea that fiscal consolidations are not exogenous to GDP growth. It is reasonable to argue that the decision to make a fiscal adjustment by the fiscal authorities is not exogenous to developments in the economy. For example, we might now anticipate fiscal retrenchments in view of recent increases in budget deficits as a consequence 7 The data for Germany starts in 1992. 8 The IMF dummy is only available for 15 countries instead of 21. In particular, this variable is not available for Austria, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.
of support packages. The deficit consolidation decision is not an exogenous and unanticipated shock unrelated to the course of the economy, an essential prerequisite to give a causal interpretation to previous non-Keynesian findings in the literature. Instead we argue that the timing of the fiscal tightening decision depends on the evolution of macroeconomic variables so that the fiscal consolidation dummy is endogenous.
In order to informally test this intuition we run country-by-country probits of the consolidation dummy on two lags of GDP growth and primary budget deficits. We then estimate the probabilities of a fiscal consolidation being carried out in a given year based on past economic outcomes. In Figure 1 we plot the real consolidation episodes according to the AA2010 definition (top panel) and the IMF definition (bottom panel) represented as grey areas, and a solid line corresponding to the predicted probabilities (or agents' expectations) for a group of six OECD countries (Italy, United Kingdom, Denmark, Japan, Ireland and Australia).
[ Figure 1 here] Looking at the top panel of Figure 1 , the AA2010 dummy seems to be fairly endogenous in the sense that it is very well predicted from past economic outcomes. We argue that this result invalidates the exogeneity assumption of fiscal consolidation episodes implicitly considered in earlier literature.
On the other hand, although some consolidation episodes defined according to the IMF narrative criterion in the bottom panel are well predicted from past economic information, some others are not predicted at all. One interpretation is that, as expected from the narrative approach, the IMF dummy is "less endogenous" than the AA2010 dummy.
In our view, Figure 1 is illustrative of the fiscal consolidation endogeneity we address in this paper. Moreover, Section 4 provides formal evidence on the potential endogeneity of fiscal consolidation to GDP growth.
Endogeneity vs. Exogeneity
One possible approach for estimating the effect of fiscal consolidations on GDP growth is based on a regression of GDP growth between t and t − 1 (g t ) on a consolidation dummy (D t ) which takes the value one at period t if there was a fiscal consolidation in this year and zero otherwise. 9 In general, studies along these lines implicitly assume that fiscal authorities ignore developments in GDP when taking the decision to make a fiscal consolidation and thus the consolidation is an unanticipated shock to agents in the economy (i.e. the consolidation dummy is exogenous to GDP). Since the evidence presented in the previous section seems to contradict the exogeneity assumption, in this paper we aim to relax it. In particular, our working assumption is that fiscal authorities, when deciding on fiscal policy 10 in year t, take 9 Note that this is equivalent to the comparison of GDP growth means before and after the consolidation episode commonly-used in the literature (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2010). 10 Note that fiscal policy in our framework is restricted to the binary decision of making a fiscal adjustment or not.
into account developments in the economy up to this year but do not anticipate the future. Given this assumption, fiscal consolidations are no longer unanticipated shocks to economic agents, i.e., the consolidation dummy is partially endogenous to GDP. 11 Under this partially endogenous assumption, we can make use of past consolidation episodes as instruments for the current consolidation decision. Note that alternatively we might also assume that fiscal authorities can also anticipate future GDP (i.e. the consolidation decision is correlated with the full path of GDP growth, past and future). However, identification under this full endogeneity assumption, which is probably more realistic, requires extra sources of variation correlated with fiscal policy but fully uncorrelated with GDP, which are not available to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, we move from the implausible full exogeneity of fiscal consolidations to the more desirable hypothesis of partially endogenous consolidations.
12
Other approaches have been considered in the literature for dealing with the potential endogeneity of fiscal policy to macroeconomic conditions. First, within a VAR framework several authors have investigated the effects of fiscal shocks on macroeconomic variables (e.g. follow the so-called narrative approach and define large discretionary changes in fiscal policy in search of exogenous (to the business cycle) sources of variation. In this paper we borrow insights from the later two alternatives and combine an IV strategy with narrative-based definitions of fiscal consolidations. Our IV approach is based on the assumption that current shocks to macroeconomic conditions are independent of past consolidation episodes but do affect current and future consolidation decisions.
Formally, the panel data model we consider is as follows:
where g it represents the GDP growth rate for country i (i = 1, ..., N ) in year t (t = 1, ..., T ), and D it is the consolidation indicator for the same country in the same year. The model also includes country-specific unobserved heterogeneity (η i ) as well as a set of time-varying common factors (δ t ) which allow the existence of cross-sectional correlations across different countries in a given period.
13
In this framework, we consider two alternative assumptions regarding the endogeneity 11 In the panel data terminology, partially endogenous regressors are also known as predetermined or weakly exogenous regressors. 12 For the sake of simplicity, we refer to partially endogenous consolidations as endogenous consolidations in the remaining of the paper. 13 Despite additional control variables can be included in equation (1), we keep the baseline specification as simple as possible in order to guarantee comparability with the strand of the literature investigating non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidations (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) . In the next section we investigate the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of other variables in the empirical model.
of the fiscal tightening decision as follows:
where
.., g it−1 ) , and
Note that, for the purpose of our paper, the key difference between the two alternatives (namely, exogeneity and endogeneity) is given by the element D i versus D t i in the conditioning set. In the exogeneity case, D i indicates that the full path of consolidations for a given country i is independent of the shock to GDP in period t. In contrast, in the endogeneity assumption (3), D t i implies that only past consolidation episodes are independent of the current shock to GDP growth while future consolidations will be affected by current GDP growth; hence we can label these consolidations as endogenous. Additionally, note that an analogous reasoning applies to the case of the lagged dependent variable (g it−1 ) which, given the dynamics of the model, is endogenous by construction. Finally, correlation between the country-specific effects (η i ) and the regressors (g it−1 and D it ) is allowed.
In order to estimate the model under the exogeneity assumption (2) we make use of a panel OLS estimator with country-specific effects. On the other hand, in order to accomodate the endogeneity assumption (3) several estimators are available in the literature. The most common approach to handling the presence of fixed effects and endogenous regressors is to first-difference the data and use the panel IV or GMM estimators suggested in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Arellano and Bond (1991) . The intuition behind both estimators is based on using lagged levels of the variables as instruments of their first differences.
14 More concretely, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose to use one lag as instrument, while, in order to gain efficiency in the estimates, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a particular combination of all available lags as instruments.
In a panel setting in which neither T is small nor N is large (as it is our case with around 20 countries and 20 time periods) the proliferation of reduced form coefficients is a concern in the Arellano and Bond's (1991) estimator 15 (see Arellano, 2004 ). This concern is even worse in our case because the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variables is not very high and the potential weak instrument bias is larger the higher the number of instruments considered (see . All in all, our preferred option is the panel IV estimator suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) because it only uses one instrument for each endogenous variable and the number of reduced form coefficients does not grow with T .
14 Another alternative is the use of the so-called system-GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) that also exploits first differences of the variables as instruments for the equation in levels. However, this estimator requires the additional assumption of mean stationarity of the variables, which in the case of GDP growth is very restrictive. The implementation of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator consists of a regression of ∆g it on ∆g it−1 and ∆D it using g it−2 and D it−1 as intruments. More concretely, the moment conditions implied by the Anderson and Hsiao's (1982) estimator -henceforth panel IVcan be expressed as follows:
The validity of the instruments considered in (4) and (5) relies on the validity of the endogeneity assumption in (3) which can be tested. Note that the endogeneity assumption (3) implies lack of autocorrelation in v it since lagged vs are linear combinations of the variables in the conditioning set. Moreover, if the errors in levels (vs) are serially independent, those in first-differences will exhibit first-but not second-order serial correlation. Therefore, testing for lack of second-order autocorrelation in ∆v it is equivalent to testing the validity of assumption (3) and thus the validity of the instruments considered in our panel IV approach. For this purpose, we will make use of the AR(2) test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) .
Finally, under the exogeneity assumption in (2), both panel OLS and panel IV estimators are consistent but panel OLS is more efficient. However, under the endogeneity assumption in (3), panel IV is consistent while panel OLS is not. Therefore, the validity of the exogeneity assumption against the endogeneity alternative will also be tested by means of a Hausman test in the next section. This paper presents the different estimates obtained under the two alternative assumptions. Anticipating the results, while the estimates based on exogeneity produce the so-called non-Keynesian effects (i.e. β > 0), the estimates under endogeneity do not (i.e. β < 0). The results obtained from the version under exogeneity are in line with previous literature. However, by relaxing the exogeneity assumption and allowing a very simple version of endogeneity, we obtain the expected effects in a Keynesian framework (i.e. fiscal consolidations negatively affect GDP growth in the short run). This is true for the consolidation dummy defined as in AA2010. For the IMF definition we obtain that in both cases the effect is negative, confirming the evidence in the previous section that the IMF dummy is "less endogenous". Moreover, while Hausman test results provide evidence against the validity of the exogeneity assumption, AR(2) tests provide evidence in favor of the validity of our panel IV approach. Table 1 presents the results from estimating the model in (1) under both the exogeneity assumption in (2) and the endogeneity assumption in (3). In particular we regress GDP growth on lagged GDP growth and a fiscal consolidation 16 dummy defined according to either the AA2010 CAPB-based criterion or the IMF narrative approach. The estimation is conducted using a panel OLS estimator for the exogenous consolidation case and the panel IV approach previously described for the endogeneity case.
Results
[ Table 1 here]
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 present the results for the CAPB-based definition of fiscal consolidation considered by AA2010. More concretely, assuming exogeneity of the consolidation in column (1), the coefficient on the consolidation dummy is positive and significant. Therefore we replicate the non-Keynesian result previously found in the literature that the fiscal multiplier might be negative (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990; Alesina and Ardagna, 1998). However, the sharp contrast once we account for the possible endogeneity of the consolidation decision in column (2) is enlightening. In particular, taking into account the feedback effects from GDP to fiscal policy decisions, we recover the typical Keynesian result and find that the fiscal adjustment produces a decrease in GDP in the short term (i.e. the coefficient on the fiscal consolidation dummy is now negative and significant). Moreover, the AR(2) test points to the validity of the instruments considered in the panel IV approach because the hypothesis of lack of second order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors cannot be rejected (note that this hypothesis is a consequence of the endogeneity assumption in (3) as explained in the previous section). Finally, the Hausman test provides clear evidence against the validity of the exogeneity assumption commonly considered in the literature, which reinforces the heuristic evidence presented in Section 3.
Turning to the IMF definition of fiscal consolidation in columns (3) and (4), we find that the impact of the fiscal retrenchment episode is negative in both cases (i.e. under exogeneity by panel OLS and under endogeneity by panel IV). However, while the negative coefficient under exogeneity is not significant at conventional levels, the estimate under endogeneity is more negative and highly significant. Thus we conclude that, in the short run, IMF narrative consolidations also have a negative effect on GDP growth as expected in a Keynesian framework. 17 The AR(2) test provides evidence in favor of the validity of the instruments considered in our panel IV estimates and thus in favor of the endogeneity assumption in (3). Finally, according to the Hausman test, the exogeneity of the IMF dummy cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level but can be rejected at the 10%. This evidence is again in line with the motivational evidence provided in Figure 1 : fiscal consolidations defined according to the narrative approach by the IMF are, to some extent, exogenous to GDP growth. Finally, columns (5) and (6) present the results for a fiscal stimulus dummy defined according to the CAPB-based critetion by AA2010. In this case we observe the same pattern, while stimuli assumed to be exogenous (column (5)) produce a negative and significant effect 16 We also present the results considering the fiscal stimulus dummy defined by AA2010. 17 The associated fiscal multipliers under endogeneity of the fiscal consolidation range from 0.2 using the AA2010 definition to 0.5 considering the IMF definition.
on output (i.e. non-Keynesian effect), under the assumption of endogenous stimuli in column (6) this non-Keynesian effect vanishes. However, in contrast to the consolidation cases, while the AR(2) test points to the validity of assumption (3), the Hausman test result indicates that exogeneity cannot be rejected.
Robustness Checks
According to Blanchard (1990) and Perotti (1999) , if consolidation is undertaken starting from a low level of current debt, a traditional positive fiscal multiplier will ensue. If, instead, fiscal consolidation is made starting from a high debt level, non-Keynesian effects via consumption might appear as a result of an expected increase in permanent income. The reason for this is that by consolidating now, the government will not raise taxes too much in the future to pay back the debt. This reduces the dead-weight loss imposed by taxes, thus raising agents' permanent income.
Alternatively, non-Keynesian effects of consolidations may take place via the behavior of investment. The link between fiscal policy and investment behavior is formalized in Alesina et al. (2002) . The main effect is represented by the impact of the government wage bill on the labor market. Investment decisions by firms are driven by the expected present value of the net marginal product of capital, which in turn is a negative function of real wages. Fiscal consolidations obtained through expenditure cuts can then reduce wage pressures and so increase short-run investments. This hypothesis crucially depends upon the composition of adjustment (expenditure cuts, particularly the wage bill, versus tax increases) and on institutional factors such as the functioning of the labor market.
On the other hand, according to the standard Keynesian view, a fiscal consolidation might be expansionary (i.e. it might be followed by revived economic growth) if it is accompanied by a sufficiently lax monetary policy. Therefore a reduction in the interest rate, or a devaluation in the case of a small economy, might generate economic growth during the process of a fiscal consolidation.
Finally, during the year 2010 financial crises have exerted an important effect on fiscal policy and in particular on the timing of fiscal consolidation programs. If fiscal retrenchments are clearly necessary (for instance because the country is paying unsustainable prices for its debt), once the government finally undertakes the consolidation, economic agents might react optimistically increasing consumption and/or investment because they have already discounted the adjustment.
In order to further investigate the existence of expansionary effects through the channels discussed above, we consider the following specification:
where Z it is one of the following variables: the government level of debt, the proportion of the adjustment due to cuts in current expenditures and more particularly in the public wage bill, a structural reform dummy 18 capturing changes in institutional factors during the fiscal consolidation episode, changes in the interest rate and the exchange rate to capture monetary policy movements, a dummy for those country-year under the Maastricht Treaty, 19 and finally, the spread of the ten-year government bond with respect to Japan as a proxy of financial turmoil in the country. These eight variables aim to explain the possibility of fiscal consolidation followed by economic growth.
Note that now the effect of the consolidation on GDP is given by:
so that even if β is negative, φ might become positive for certain values of the Z variables; for instance, for a sufficiently high level of debt or interest rate spread, for a sufficiently high cut in public wages, for those consolidations accompanied by pro-market structural reforms or expansive monetary policy. Table 2 presents the results for estimating equation (6) for the eight different Z variables considered using the two alternative consolidation dummies available (CAPB-based from AA2010, and action-based from the IMF). As described in the previous section, we estimate the equation under endogeneity.
[ Table 2 here] The main conclusion from the estimates in Table 2 is that, in general, there is no positive effect from fiscal consolidations to GDP growth through the channels tested (i.e. φ is negative). Neither the investment channel nor the consumption channel of non-Keynesian effects seem to be at work according to these results (see columns from (1) to (8)). On the other hand, neither the Masstricht dummy nor the spread of the ten-year government bonds seem to explain consolidations followed by economic growth (see columns (11) , (12), (15) , and (16) in Table 2 ).
However, the estimates in columns (9) and (13) indicate that a positive coefficient arises when the fiscal consolidation is accompanied by lax monetary policy. 20 In particular, if the fiscal adjustment is carried out together with a reduction in the short-term interest 18 We employ the reform dummy in Duval (2008) . For the construction of this dummy, we first consider an overall index of rigidity measuring the anti-competitive/distortionary effects of policies for the 21 OECD countries included in our sample over the period 1985-2003 in five policy areas: labor taxes, unemployment benefit system, employment protection legislation (EPL), retirement schemes and product market regulations. Secondly, given this index, a reform in a given policy field is identified by a dummy taking value 1 whenever the corresponding index of rigidity falls sufficiently. As a benchmark, the requirement is a change in the index to be below the 20th percentile of its distribution across the whole sample. A labor market reform dummy from Boeri and Garibaldi (2009) was also considered with the same results. 19 In order to maintain the price stability within the Eurozone, the Maastricht criteria impose some requisites on the inflation rate, the annual government deficit, the level of government debt, and the longterm interest rate of the country members. The effects of a fiscal adjustment in countries subject to the Maastricht Treaty might differ from those in countries without these requisites. 20 In the form of interest rate reductions. Changes in the exchange rate do not seem to account for expansionary fiscal consolidations according to the results in columns (10) and (14) .
rate larger than 28% (for instance a fall in the interest rate from 3% to 2.16%), we might expect revived economic growth in the subsequent periods. Our interpretation is that the Keynesian effects of such a monetary policy compensate the negative (and also Keynesian) effects of the fiscal retrechment.
Effect on Consumption, Investment, and Unemployment
In order to further investigate the channels through which fiscal consolidations affect GDP, we now turn to the estimation of the effects of fiscal consolidations on private consumption, private investment and the unemployment rate for a panel of OECD countries. van Aarle and Garretsen (2003) and Hogan (2004) , among others, estimate consumption functions and test whether the impact of government revenues and expenditures on consumption is different when fiscal consolidations take place. Alesina et al. (2002) conduct the same kind of analysis but estimating investment equations instead of consumption equations. We may also interpret the estimate of the consolidation effects on consumption and/or investment as an additional test of the two non-Keynesian hypotheses in the previous section.
We again estimate equation (1) but replacing GDP growth with consumption, investment, and unemployment growth:
where g it represents the growth rate between t − 1 and t in country i, h=(consumption, investment, unemployment), and the remaining terms are as in equation (1). We estimate this model under endogeneity of the fiscal adjustment for the two alternative definitions of consolidation (AA2010 and IMF).
[ Table 3 here] Table 3 presents the results. We observe in columns (1) and (2) that the effect of a fiscal consolidation episode on the investment growth rate is negative and significant under endogeneity of the fiscal tightening decision. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect on private investment is much larger than the effect on GDP growth. In particular, a fiscal consolidation causes, on average, a decrease in the rate of growth of investment of 55-105 basis points.
Regarding the effect on private consumption in columns (3) and (4), the evidence is mixed: while the effect of a fiscal consolidation on the consumption growth rate is negative and significant when considering the IMF action-based denition of consolidation, the estimated effect is not significant according to the CAPB-based definition by AA2010. The opposite pattern arises for the rate of growth of unemployment in columns (5) and (6) . The effect is positive and significant according to the AA2010 consolidation definition but it becomes insignificant when considering the IMF definition.
Concluding Remarks
The literature on non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy (e.g. Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) argues that fiscal consolidations might promote economic growth even in the short run. Using data for a panel of OECD countries over the years 1980-2007 we replicate this result under exogeneity of the fiscal tightening maneouvre with respect to the evolution of GDP.
However, the decision to carry out a fiscal adjustment in order to restore the budget balance might not be independent of developments in the economy. This paper provides evidence in favor of this hypothesis and estimates the effect of fiscal retrenchments on GDP growth accounting for the potential endogeneity of these episodes. Considering feedback effects from GDP to the decision of when to consolidate (i.e. considering endogenous fiscal consolidations) we find that fiscal adjustments are costly in terms of GDP growth as expected from a Keynesian viewpoint. This result holds for both the CAPB-based definition of consolidation considered in Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and the fiscal consolidations defined by the IMF (2010) following the narrative approach.
This sharp contrast between the results under exogeneity and under endogeneity indicates that non-Keynesian effects of fiscal consolidation episodes previously found in the literature might be due to reverse causality from expectations about economic growth to the timing of the fiscal adjustment. We therefore conclude that immediately after a fiscal consolidation revived economic growth might occur in spite of the adjustment but not as a consequence of it.
A Appendix

A.1 Data Appendix
This section describes the data employed in the paper. All data are from the OECD Economic Outlook Database no. 84.
• Government debt level: government gross debt as a share of GDP.
• Deficit level: cyclically adjusted primary deficit as a share of GDP (i.e. primary expenses minus total revenue)
• ∆Wage expenditures: Change in government wage bill expenditures.
• GDP growth: Yearly growth rate of real per capita GDP for each country.
• ∆Interest rate: Change in the real short-run interest rates between t + 1 and t.
• ∆Exchange rate: Change in the exchange rate between t + 1 and t.
• Investment growth: Yearly growth rate of private non-residential gross fixed capital formation.
• Consumption growth: Yearly growth rate of private final consumption expenditure.
• Unemployment growth: Yearly growth rate of the unemployment rate.
• Structural reform dummy from Duval (2008). 
under diferent exogeneity/endogeneity assumptions and for two alternative consolidation dummies (AA2010 and IMF). In columns (5) and (6) the consolidation dummy is substituted by the stimulus dummy defined in Alesina and Ardagna (2010) . Panel OLS with country-specific effects is the estimator considered in columns (1), (3) and (5) under the exogeneity assumption, and the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) panel IV estimator is employed in columns (2), (4) and (6) under the endogeneity assumption. AR(2) test p-value refers to the p-values from the Arellano and Bond's (1991) test for the lack of second order autocorrelation in the first differenced errors. Under this null hypothesis the instruments considered to address the endogeneity are valid because the errors in levels are not correlated as implied by assumption (3). Hausman p-value reports the obtained p-value from a Wald test of the null of exogenous fiscal consolidations (i.e. the null of equality between the coefficients estimated by panel OLS -efficient under the null-and panel IV -consistent under the null but robust to partial endogeneity-). If exogeneity of the fiscal consolidation holds, the null of equality of coefficients would be true. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country level. Table presents the results of estimating equation (6) (g it = αg it−1 + βD it + γZ it D it + η i + δt + v it ) under the endogeneity assumption and for two alternative consolidation dummies (AA2010 and IMF). In this specification we regress the GDP growth rate on the consolidation dummy adding an interaction term between the dummy and eight alternative Z variables (Z * Consolidation). This interaction term allows the possibility of a positive effect of the fiscal consolidation episode for certain values of Z even if β is negative. In particular, the overall effect of the fiscal adjustment is given by φ = β + γZ it . The significance of the interaction term allows us to test if non-keynesian effects might appear under certain circumstances surrounding the consolidation episode as proposed in the literature (e.g. consumption channel if the debt of Government debt is high enough, investment channel if the adjustment is based on reducing public wages, lax monetary policy accompanying the consolidation...) The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) panel IV estimator is employed in all columns. Dependent variable is always the GDP growth rate. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country level. (8), (Growth h it = α Growth h it−1 + β Consolidation it + η i + δt + v it where h is consumption, investment or unemployment) under the endogeneity assumption and for two alternative consolidation dummies (AA2010 and IMF). The Anderson and Hsiao (1982) panel IV estimator is employed in all the columns. AR(2) test p-value refers to the p-values from the Arellano and Bond's (1991) test for the lack of second order autocorrelation in the first differenced errors. Under this null hypothesis the instruments considered to address the endogeneity are valid because the errors in levels are not correlated as implied by assumption (3). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
IMF Dummy
This graph presents the consolidation episodes over the period 1980-2007 defined according to the IMF narrative approach (grey areas) and the precited probabilities from past economic information (solid line). Predicted probabilities are estimated from a country-by-country probit of the consolidation dummy on two lags of GDP growth and primary deficit.
